Architecture, Development, Memory

Hal Foster

I am not an architectural historian. I say this partly as an excuse and partly to be permitted to write speculatively – in a way that people schooled in a professional language do not often write. Cultural critics often regard contemporary architecture as if it were somehow isomorphic to economic forces. Although I, too, will sometimes treat it here as a simple inert object, what in fact interests me is its discursive complexity.

The Russian Revolution confronted artists with the potential anachronism of the category Art. So now, in a very different way, advanced capitalism confronts architects with the possible obsolescence of the category Architecture. But one can read this development otherwise – as a mandate to think the 'refunctioning' of the discipline. The first part of my text touches on the present conditions of such a refunctioning; the second part of the text concerns the emblematic role of architecture in historicist models of history.

I want to begin with a general remark about criticism that is especially important for architectural discourse. For me the concept of criticism is bound up with the concept of the public sphere. Now whether one regards this sphere as historical or heuristic, criticism depends on it. In certain ways the two forms, the institution of criticism and the notion of the public, are coeval aspects of the same bourgeois cultural revolution. Of course, this revolution was stopped short when other groups – initially other classes – demanded that the rights and representations of the bourgeoisie be made truly public, truly open to all. This demand continues in different ways, and it is only in this form, in the many counter-publics of the present, that one can speak of a public sphere at all (for the most part, the old public sphere has gone the way of spectacle – to the point of our corporate-state-media sphere). Yet,

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institutionally, criticism has not proven very able to sustain these counterpublics, to articulate residual and/or emergent interests alternative to dominant ones. Nor has it proven very able to pressure architecture, its institutional support, to do so. By and large it has accepted its own default – even embraced its erosion as a site of analysis and alternative. Too many architectural critics are bagmen for the boys downtown. If this sounds reactive at best, paranoid at worst, it is. And that is my second general point about criticism today. Critical culture depends on political culture, and our political culture is reactive in its anxiety about the present; the mainstream is pledged against the innovative, the other.**?!** In such a climate criticism cannot help but be reactive too, and it is; when it is not simple ratification, criticism is steeped in resentment, trapped in negation, severed from affirmation. And I mean affirmation that is critical, not celebratory, of the status quo – affirmation that releases new modes of thought and action as well as rescuing repressed modes in cultural, social, and political life. There is a great atrophy of this annunciatory criticism today, and practice atrophies with it.

What does all this mean for contemporary architecture? For one thing, it is rarely received as a practice of public concern. How often do the journals present architecture as a civic issue of civic participation? And how often, when it is so discussed, does the subject involve everyday building – and not this designer-design or that architect-personality? When architecture is received as an activity of public concern, this public is rarely captured in its condition of conflict and contestation; it is seen instead as a supine statistic. As a result, architecture and public become disjunct; one effect is that the public aspects of architecture are treated as reified quotients. Relegated to categories like *ersatz* atriums and puny plazas, meaningless monuments and monster malls, these public quotients of architecture are compensatory; they serve, like most public art, as pathetic substitutes for spaces of public appearance (at least such nineteenth-century precedents as the department store and the grand boulevard possessed a phantasmagorical wonder that provoked a reflexive, Baudelairean subculture; so far the malls have given us 'Dawn of the Dead').**?!** A nuisance to powers that be, they are used only by the homeless, who are harassed there (the rest of us are merely surveyed).

?! *You represent the situation as an accomplished fact. On the one hand you suggest a certain margin for political involvement in architecture, which could manifest itself also in criticism; on the other hand this criticism doesn't amount to much because of its present reactive nature. This ambiguity appears to be the main origin of your trust in small-scale solutions, for instance when you refer to architects such as Aalto and Siza. However, these architects are known to have connections with local structures of power, be it that they appear less dangerous in periphery Finland or Portugal than in Manhattan. What, if any, possibilities do you envision for politically articulated positions in the centre of power?*

?! *Two decades ago Manfredo Tafuri described in his* Project and Utopia *how Modern architecture, aspiring to manifest itself outside its confinements, to become a political movement, had failed. As a result, at the close of the seventies strong sentiments against architecture becoming a sociological issue arose. Its autonomy was proclaimed. The question is: could the professional architect still be identified as such, while following your advice?*

Venice Biennial, Fifth International Exhibition of Architecture, 1991

Ville Nouvelle, Marne la Vallée, Paris, 1984

Battery Park, New York City, 1987

Another corollary effect of this discursive separation of architecture and public is that architecture is regarded primarily as an individual practice – again, in terms of this design by that architect-personality or this project by that megalomaniac-developer.

Not much critical consideration is given to the social complexity of architecture (e.g., the impact of an office building on the community of its site or the psyches of its users) or even to the actual practice of building: not just grand projects like the mini-city spectacles of a Baltimore waterfront, but the workaday architecture of new urban villages, office parks, and governmental buildings. As far as I can tell, such activities are rarely acknowledged by architectural discourse; they are shunted into other categories (Business, Real Estate, Arts and Leisure). And this, I submit, is an extraordinary mystification in which architectural criticism, theory, and education all generally participate. The powers that be (the Philip Johnsons, Donald Trumps or local administrators) could not devise a more perfect ideological mask than the one we produce and reproduce daily in the course of our own practices as architects, critics, and teachers – even (or especially) when we think we are at our most theoretically subversive (my tone may suggest that these developments are new, but in fact they comprise the present state of an historical process – the architectural/urban vision of state capitalism – punctuated by such famous figures as Baron Haussmann and Otto Wagner, Albert Speer and Robert Moses, Philip Johnson and John Portman).

On this score, architectural criticism is an easy target, but it is not my only one. Architecture in the academy also participates in this mystification. It does so simply when it excludes or neglects certain mundane architectures, political processes, or social groups. In my limited exposure to architectural conferences and academic critiques (the first often gladiatorial, the second always sadistic), these things are often held to be beneath contempt or at least beneath interest. Again, I speak as a layman, and for the layman two figures have come to dominate the field: the *developer-architect* and the *academic architect*. According to this view, architecture has become subsumed by development, on the one hand; on the other hand, it has become rarefied in the academy. This is cynical, perhaps overly so, for there are points of resistance and renewal in both arenas. But this process of reification and rarefaction in architecture cannot be denied. How is this located historically? Does it begin with the split between architecture and engineering – a split that rarefies the practice of the former as it allows the logic of the latter to dominate? Does it derive from the ambiguous position of architecture, as the most practical or worldly of the arts, in the Modernist projection of formal autonomy? This will to autonomy was also part of the bourgeois cultural revolution, but to a great extent its critical charge is now void. Indeed, to a great extent this will to autonomy allowed the rarefaction of architecture in the academy that in turn abetted its reification in development. In any case, exactly how this happened, exactly how the developer-architect and the academic-architect were produced, I cannot say. I can say, however, that one way to respond to these twin figures is to produce another dialectical pair: as opposed to the *developer-architect*, the *political architect*; and as opposed to the *academic-architect*, the *counter-disciplinary architect*.

Now what might this first creature, the political architect, be today? For example, rather than develop homeless shelters as part of a zoning variation or a building deal (as a developer might), an architect could work to expose the architectural preconditions of homelessness – maybe not in building, maybe not in drawing, maybe outside the discipline as it exists today. But to present schematic shelters to the homeless or to reimagine the house type altogether – the first as a conscientious salve, the second as a compensatory vision of grandeur – is not enough. Instead an architect might reveal the production of homelessness as an effect not only of certain policies (regarding welfare, housing funds, and so forth) but also of certain architectural/urban assumptions. Now, perhaps, I sound naive rather than cynical, for what happens then to architecture? Might it not just become politics or economics or sociology?



John Portman in the interior of the Marriott Marquis Hotel

In part. But what is architecture now, what has it ever been? Such an analysis is not irrelevant to sophisticated discourse. Deconstructivist architects argue that both Pre-Modern and Modern architecture are mired in a metaphysics of presence – of the shelter, of the home. If this is true, an antifoundational critique of such architecture might make the homeless its subject. So, too, it might consider the *unheimlich,* the uncanny. Both these terms exist at the limit of architecture. Architecture enframes. Abjected, the homeless are pushed outside the frame – and so challenge it. The same is true of the uncanny: architecture rarely allows for sensual intuitions of space and structure; what might happen if it entertained unconscious ones? Indeed, what might a psychoanalytical architecture be?

What about the figure of the counter-disciplinary architect? I pose this figure in opposition to the rarefied academic-architect, and here I appeal to a post-structuralism that is not so active in architectural discussion today, at least as this discussion centres on deconstructivist architecture. We can argue whether deconstructivist architecture is truly deconstructive of architecture, or true to the methodology of deconstruction; clearly architecture is an important site for an inquiry. But at some point we must ask where such architecture stands in relation to the general rarefaction-reification of the discipline today. For example, it may well address the metaphysical assumptions, the humanist subject-positions, of architecture in a Derridean sense. But does it engage the aspects of the discipline in the Foucauldean sense? Unless it does, I am not sure how fully critical, even deconstructive, it can be. I mention Foucault to suggest one way that a counter-disciplinary architecture might proceed to think the disciplinary aspects of architecture. I use 'disciplinary' in the sense of how architecture constructs its authorial subjects and trains its practitioners as architects (in relation to other discourses and practices, of course, but also in the university, even in apparently nondisciplinary curricula and projects); and disciplinary in the sense of how architecture constructs its recipient subjects, trains our spatialities and temporalities, our bodies and minds, our conscious and unconscious activities. In short, the point is not so much to contrive (say) anti-panoptical projects, but to consider whether or not architecture can be thought outside a system of a surveyed space, outside a regime of a disciplinary gaze, outside an order of regimented

bodies, outside a time-space of compelled circulation (the flow of people, goods, information, money) – in short, to think architecture in terms of its technical, microphysical effects on our bodies and minds.

A question here in passing: for Foucault the gaze historically produced in different architectures and inscribed in different subjects is sexually indifferent. Is this so? Can a critical architecture today afford to think that it is so? And a personal aside as well: recently, I have become interested in typological developments. Some time ago (1988) I was in Seattle, my hometown, for an architecture conference. As if to compensate for its evermore dense downtown, there is a spacious new mall, and it struck me as a weird inversion: an initially urban type, the department store, first developed into a suburban type, the shopping centre, now returned to an urban setting. This inversion – it has happened elsewhere too – is troublesome, because the suburban mall is presented as a primary form of public urban space. It is accepted as a space of public memory, too, which makes it even more problematic, for in such spaces the history of place is consumed as spectacle. In Seattle, this means the use of a North-west Coast Indian design abstracted as a general logo for the mall.

A few weeks later I was in San Francisco, where I saw a further development of the mall type called the San Francisco Emporium. Here not only is the suburban mall transplanted to the city, but the horizontality of the shopping centre is rotated back to the verticality of the department store. Picture a structure that is a spiral à la Guggenheim: the floors appear as bands around a central abyss. On every floor, one is forced to stop, to walk by stores, and to pick up each escalator. Granted, I was there in the Christmas frenzy, but I have never experienced such architectural delirium; it is beyond the vertigo registered by Fredric Jameson in the Portman Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles. Apart from the subjective effects, people are positioned in this emporium as particles in a wave chart, surveyed and directed strictly in terms of flow (do men and women, children and adults, inhabit this flow differently? Do designers account for such differences?). Meanwhile, the stores, long eroded within by the protean commodity, are now eroded without by the demands of circulation. There is minimal definition of each store; in fact, the structure has an almost televisual transparency that attests to the present transformation of architecture in our social regime of spectacle surveillance (indeed, a primary architectural experience today is an image of your own body in a monitored space – an elevator, an apartment lobby, a museum, etcetera. The limits of architecture are continually extended, dissolved, redefined in this way – caught between the inertia of our bodies and the acceleration of everything else).



Michael Belenky, photograph of old West Side Highway, New York City, with Intrepid sea Air Space Museum in the background, 1988

For architecture to be critical in the counter-disciplinary sense that I want to develop it must reflect on its own role in techniques of power. I am confident that such investigations are underway. Here, however, rather than speculate, it might be useful to consider, albeit abstractly, the premises of critical programmes already in place. Often such programmes are conceived in terms of an oppositional architecture. This immediately raises the famous question of Aldo van Eyck: 'How to pose an architectural counterform in an urban society without form?' I used to think this was a provocative paradox, but it now strikes me as a misbegotten opposition, one that may debilitate more than support a critical practice. For the notion of a 'counterform' suggests that there is only an outside or inside to our social dynamic, a dynamic that the notion of 'a society without form' suggests we cannot really know. But our capitalist social dynamic can be known; it may be difficult to represent, let alone resist, but this is not a priori an impossibility, at least as long as one does not oppose an outside to an inside. This opposition is now deconstructed – less by Derrida or Deleuze, Peter Eisenman or Bernard Tschumi (though they help us to think it) than by advanced capitalism. And yet it still seems operative in critical thought, in architectural thought, where it is reproduced in such a way as to constrain theory and practice to one of two positions: either an inside position, such as the model of a 'collage city,' which is often interpreted as a curatorial, even commemorative approach to modern development, or an outside position, from which one can only impose a more or less utopian model onto the city. (this latter position often takes the form of a will-to-monumentality in Modernism and a will-to-marginality today). In the inside position, one tends to 'relate to the forces of the *Großstadt* like a surfer to a wave' (as Rem Koolhaas has put it); and in the outside position, one seeks to transform the city according to some totalist logic or some private dream. When such a transformation was partially possible, it tended to tear up the city – to fragment it all the more. And now, when it is much less possible, it serves to reinforce the marginality of the architect, a marginality that many architects today fetishistically embrace as if architecture were now only sustained authentically through tokens of its 'loss' or 'impossibility'.

My point here is not that the notion of an oppositional architecture should be surrendered, but that its



Rem Koolhaas/OMA, Très Grande Bibliothèque, competition entry, 1989

Zaha Hadid, Moon Soon restaurant and bar, Sapporo, 1990

terms must be rethought. It might be that the notion of a critical architecture is problematic too, but for the opposite reason: not because it projects a mythical outside to the social field (an outside that is then either heroically overcome or whimsically embraced), but because it assumes too much the field that it seeks to transform. By this assumption it becomes closed to the very historical changes, to the very innovations in spatialities and subjectivities that it might otherwise articulate to radical effect. Such articulation, by the way, is my ideal: an architecture that, rather than discipline spaces and subjects to a synchronic calculus of design and technique, recovers residual spatialities and subjectivities and articulates emergent ones – an architecture that would, in effect, set architecture in motion in a way sensitive to the nonsynchronous nature of our historical experience.

How is such a model different from an architecture of resistance? Maybe this is to hypostatise another term (as perhaps I did above with the notions of 'oppositional' and 'critical' architectures), but 'resistance' seems to stake a defensive posture; that is, it tends to forfeit the annunciatory possibilities of practice. In short, like 'opposition,' 'resistance' must also be rethought; what this might mean can be suggested by a very important model of an architecture of resistance, the model of 'critical regionalism' proposed by Kenneth Frampton.★

Frampton begins with an opposition of universal civilization (rationalist, 'technophilic', capitalist) and regional culture; the first is pledged to appropriative expansion, the second to cultural difference. Rather than trust in the innovative aspects of new capital or in the traditional aspects of old cultures, he advocates a dialectical engagement of the one by the other, whereby each in effect criticises and corrects the other. It is a strong concept, one that, articulated in the work of his cited designers (Alvar Aalto, Jørn Utzon, and Mario Botta), can approximate the sort of architecture I advocated above – an architecture sensitive to the complexities of residual and emergent spatialities and subjectivities. But unless one lives in a relatively homogeneous society (as did or does the Finn Aalto, the Dane Utzon, and the Swiss Botta), it may be difficult to act upon today. For the principle of 'critical regionalism' is tied to a problem that may not still be our own, not entirely anyway. A primary theoretical source for the notion of 'critical regionalism' is a 1961 essay called *Universal Civilization and National Cultures* by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur. In 1961 – after the liberation wars of the fifties and before

★ In his article 'Toward a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance', in Hal Foster (ed.), *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, Washington 1983.



Jørn Utzon, Bagsvaerd Church, 1976

the neocolonial conquests of the sixties and seventies (that is, before the First World's re-penetration of the Third World to supply its labour fund and marketplace) – Ricoeur could still look to the new post-colonial configuration of the world with optimism. In such a moment of release it was possible to project a genuine 'dialogue' between worlds, to insist on the resistance of the regional; twenty-eight years later it has become much more difficult. This is not to say that mono-civilisation is an accomplished fact, that capitalism has penetrated everywhere. (I have less and less sympathy for the apocalyptic models of contemporary cultural criticism that speak of a universal West or a hyperrealistic world; often such criticism is simply another refusal of differences.) But it is to say that relations of global and regional, centre and periphery, are much more complex today. As the Vietnamese filmmaker and writer Trin T. Minh-ha says, there are First Worlds in every Third World and Third Worlds in every First World, to say nothing of Second and Fourth Worlds. What does this complexity and contradiction do to the model of 'critical regionalism', which again seems to rely on homogeneous local cultures for its articulation? How might it be complicated in its turn?***?!*** Perhaps it can be complicated along the lines of the model of 'cognitive mapping' proposed by Fredric Jameson.★ In this model Jameson relates the relative inability to map a phenomenological position in the megapolis – as demonstrated by Kevin Lynch and colleagues in the 1961 *The Image of the City* – to the relative inability to map international class relations in advanced capitalism. In so doing, he extrapolates the concept of cognitive mapping in Althusserian terms. And yet, though he complicates it greatly, the principle of a 'map-in-the-head' seems to contradict his own diagnoses of the Post-Modern condition of schizoid subjectivities and deterritorialised spaces. This said, one can fully support the project – to think the renewal of sited political communities that can act locally and think globally.

★ Jameson, Fredric, 'Cognitive Mapping', in Nelson, C. and L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Cultures*, Urbana/Chicago, 1988.

If my discussion seems contradictory, it may well be. I am not sure of my own position among these discourses. But I can point to a general problem that any contemporary critical practice must confront. This is not a problem strictly located 'beyond' architecture; in fact, contemporary architecture sometimes addresses and sometimes abets it. The problem involves the principal ideologeme of the discourse of postmodernism: the atrophy of the historical sense and of the utopian imagination; more precisely,

?! *In the meantime it developed far beyond this point. The confusion caused by the notion of regionalism led us to deep six this entire critical regionalism. The architects allegedly sailing under this flag, however, sometimes developed an awesome respect for the phenomenology of architecture, which at times shows neo-animistic traces.*

'The past as picture, history as stage.' Thomas Cole, The Architect's Dream, 1840

the inability to grasp the past except scenographically as a series of pictures or tableaux and to project the future except in terms of entropy or apocalypse, according to scenarios of slow capitalist contamination or sudden technological catastrophe. Obviously, this inability circumscribes any practice that seeks to develop the contradictions of the present into a critical consciousness of past formations and future possibilities. In the space remaining, I want to touch on a few of its implications. I have discussed the problem of the future seen in terms of an autonomous technology in another place.★ Here I want to focus on the problem of the past seen as a picture. Though invalidated a long time ago, this model remains operative in many ways.

★ Foster, Hal, 'Neofuturism: Architecture and Technology', *A.A. Files* 14, (Spring 1987).

We tend to cherish our faculty of memory even as its activity remains obscure to us. Yet, its institutional determinations are historically problematic. In Antiquity, for example, memory was an aspect of rhetoric, part of a system of persuasion and power; in scholasticism, memory was an aspect of ethics, part of a regimen of obedience and order. Of specific interest here is that from its institutional beginnings memory was often conceived in architectural terms as a mnemonic of place and image: in rhetoric the orator would devise an architecture of elements to which were assigned specific ideas, even words, to be recalled in the course of argument.★ Now this particular art of memory may seem innocuous, but it sets up a persistent cultural pattern that is not innocuous: the tendency to think of memory in terms of space, in effect to spatialise time, to pictorialise history. This has many ramifications: our tendency to consider knowledge in terms of visual sites (like topics, tables, taxonomies); more importantly, our tendency to reduce the past (personal and collective) to so many tableaux for aesthetic contemplation, which, as we know, is so often melancholic, nostalgic, passive. It is in this way, in part, that we restrict our historical apprehension, that we effectively repress many histories by our symptomatic representation of a few dominant ones. This, of course, is an old Freudian problem. In a famous early passage in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud relates the dream to the rebus in order to suggest the folly of a pictorial reading as opposed to a linguistic interpretation. And in a famous late passage in *Civilization and its Discontents*, he suggests that it is misbegotten to see the individual unconscious in terms of space. There he draws the analogy of a ruinous Rome – of a Rome whose levels and fragments obscure one another. But the unconscious, he argues, does not work in this way; it is formed in a process of repression, not ruination. The same is true of our collective unconsciousness, of our tribal histories – or so I would argue. They cannot be spatialised, they should not be pictorialised.**?!** And yet this is how, at many levels of historical awareness, we still grasp the past – as a sequence of pictures, a series of monuments.

★ See Yates, Frances, *The Art of Memory*.

?! *Would this be a pronunciation with objective claims, or do we detect residues of iconoclast tradition in which a picture is not necessarily true? Like your recommended source of inspiration, Foucault, you are preoccupied with oppression, suppression and repression. But, keeping the means and purpose of education in mind, one is likely to advocate an expressed representation of our history.*

There is a painting in which this ideology is stated bluntly because confidently: *The Architect's Dream* (1840) by the American, Thomas Cole. There is much one might say about this picture. What, for example, is the mythical origin, the vanishing point, at which the architect gazes? Is this figure not, in some sense, a naive avatar of the *Angelus Novus* of Paul Klee and Walter Benjamin, who, caught up in the storm called progress that propels him backward into the future, sees nothing but ruins amass before him? Here, I invoke the painting simply as a diagram of the dynastic or imperial model of history. It is a model in which the architectural – the monumental – stands in for the historical. This fetishism of the monument serves two purposes – both to commemorate and to disavow historical change: to commemorate the ascendant (American) bourgeoisie as the self-proclaimed epitome of history, to commemorate its claim to a post-historical position from which history is simply collected as so many pictures or styles, and to disavow this history, to disavow that it, the bourgeoisie, is involved in historicity. Traditional art history is riven by this same contradictory ideology; architecture is too. In fact, the still dominant model of art history – that of Wölfflin – tells its narrative as a continuous reinterpretation of past works, and this model is based – explicitly for Wölfflin – on the paradigm of architecture. It quickly became structural to the pedagogy of art history, especially when, with the technology of the photograph, the concept of transcendental style could be contrived and the method of abstract comparison established. To our eyes, the Cole painting might seem a parody before the fact of this art-

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historical model of opposed cyclical styles, but this is still dominant pedagogical practice. And that is my point, or rather my question: as crude, as obvious, as this ideology of the historical appears to us, I wonder if we have truly surpassed it. I do not mean simply its dynastic or linear aspects. I mean its fetishistic aspect, its selective-suppressive aspect. I mean the model of the past as picture, of history as stage (as in the Cole painting) and as rhetorical theatre of exclusive memory performed strictly for us. For all the many critiques of historicism, most of us, I think, remain members of this modern cult of monuments.

Of course, my critique of the-past-as-picture is directed, in part, at so-called Post-Modern architecture, but it extends to many other practices as well. In two famous essays, *The Age of the World Picture* and *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger considered this problem. In the first essay, written before World War II, the-world-as-representation and the-individual-as-subject of-this-representation are seen to be coeval. In the second essay written after the war, both the-world-as-picture and the-individual-as-subjected-subject are seen to be produced out of a fundamental instrumentality that has become second nature to modern man. And here the crucial term is the past not only as picture but also, in this perspectival array, as 'standing-reserve' – there as a repository to be used as we wish. This instrumentality is linked by Heidegger to a pervasive technology, and it is this technology that he rails against. Has architecture broken with any of this – with this model of the past as picture and standing-reserve, with this instrumentality and technology? Can it? If we want to develop a relationship to the past that is redemptive and not fetishistic, and a relationship to the future that is responsive and not destructive, I think it must. (There is also an historical question to ask in passing: What is the relation between the establishment of Architecture with a capital A and the instantiation of perspective? Was Architecture thus set up in perspectival opposition to the subject at its very beginning?)

'The-world-as-representation.' Toraja *tonkonan* style on the roof of a modern villa, Rantepao, Sulawesi

By way of a conclusion, I want briefly to think about this problematic art of memory, this pictorial fetishism of history, as it is inscribed in our museum architecture and our museal culture in general. I want to do so by reference to a 1985 Louise Lawler photograph of a storage space in the Rude Museum in Dijon. (Rude is best known as the sculptor of the emblem of French patriotism, *La Marseillaise*, of 1833-36, part of a cast of which is seen in the centre of the Lawler image.)

The caption given to the photo reads in part: 'The Art of Memory – the restriction and placement, its deposition in material form with extreme emphasis on presentation, selects a limited number of acceptable issues with limited ways to speak.' Now this old art of memory lives on, of course, not only in architecture, but also in the museum. Indeed, the typical museum is a theatre of memory where works of art as pictures of the past serve fetishistically to occlude more than to clarify historical practices. But this theatre of memory does not begin or end there. It is endemic to our museal culture: it may be one reason why we still tend to think time in terms of inert stages or phases rather than, say, dialectically or in difference (again, I would argue, architecture is emblematic of this history of periods and pictures). This spatialisation of time has an important corollary no less endemic to our museal culture: the tendency to temporalise space, so that different peoples are said to inhabit different times, so that 'further away' comes to mean 'more primitive'. As Johannes Fabian argues in *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (1983), this is largely how we construct our others; if we do not deny them historical time altogether, we freeze them in the past. That is, either we assign them to different developmental moments in our own history, or we judge them according to an imposed criterion of authenticity whereby they only really existed – genuinely, purely – in the past. This pastoral myth of cultural loss seems sweet if sad, but its effects are insidious, for it positions other cultures as mere ruins that must be saved by us and stored in our own theatres of memory – in our texts, museums, architecture. This murderous myth not only permits the continued appropriation of the past of other cultures, but also blocks any constructive engagement with the 'present-becoming-future' (*James Clifford*) of these cultures. In any case, one sees the effects not only of this pictorialising of our own past but also this plundering of other cultures everywhere in our culture today, and in many ways architecture has propounded this phantasmagoria more than any other cultural practice.